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Re: Judgment and Darwin

george simons — Sat, 05 Jul 2008 10:05:44 GMT

As regards the Critique of Practic Reason: The “man” in a practical respective, carries out his actions in accordance with the pure form of law, of duty

Re: Further downhill

Un Known — Sat, 05 Jul 2008 05:32:23 GMT

Yet I find this kind of statement all the time in Kant's writings: "Natural right, understood simply as that right which is not statutory, and which is

Re: Further downhill

Omar — Sat, 05 Jul 2008 05:00:48 GMT

Kant is careful not to use the word knowledge with respect to the practical with good reason. He must insure that the two faculties do not intrude on each

Re: Further downhill

Omar — Sat, 05 Jul 2008 04:55:43 GMT

Omar ... From: new_idea_2007 To: kant-l@yahoogroups.com Sent: Friday, July 4, 2008 11:11:51 PM Subject: [kant-l] Re: Further

Judgment and Darwin

new_idea_2007 — Sat, 05 Jul 2008 02:37:38 GMT

So often I have read in Kant pages perplexity about the nature of the relationship between the two books constituting the Critique of Judgment. Kant's Critique

Re: Further downhill

new_idea_2007 — Fri, 04 Jul 2008 15:11:52 GMT

Rights, as you say, are not in the domain of theoretical knowledge, but they do arise from the domain of practical knowledge. This is a knowledge from an

Re: Further downhill

Omar — Fri, 04 Jul 2008 09:30:08 GMT

Rights indeed belong to the domain of the noumenal, in the way that theoretical knowledge never can. For rights belong to the moral domain, and take their

Re: Further downhill

new_idea_2007 — Fri, 04 Jul 2008 05:23:11 GMT

We have knowledge of rights, where rights are a form of thing-in-itself and never manifest as appearance. This example goes contrary to the statement, "We

Re: Further downhill

Omar — Fri, 04 Jul 2008 03:01:00 GMT

things in themselves never appear for Kant. Omar ... From: new_idea_2007 To: kant-l@yahoogroups.com Sent: Friday, July 4, 2008

Further downhill

new_idea_2007 — Thu, 03 Jul 2008 19:50:24 GMT

"That is true Omar. We cannot know what cannot appear. We can know what does appear, and what does appear is (usually, but not always) the thing itself. I say

Downhill

new_idea_2007 — Wed, 02 Jul 2008 02:45:20 GMT

"Suppose I say: I saw John in the next room. What is lacking in universality here? Am I not a real person, with a real perspective, made of a real

Re: Kant's categories today

Omar Lughod — Thu, 03 Apr 2008 07:00:23 GMT

Bruce, Nietzsche and Hegel, vis a vis the Chinese: I have taught them classes on each. They have a cultural awareness of Hegel, vis a vis, Marx, who is

Re: Kant's categories today

Bruce Merrill — Mon, 31 Mar 2008 11:30:22 GMT

Omar, For me quotidian experience is not a matter of mystification and folk myths (as you find in China) but of our manipulation of familiar stable macroscopic

Re: Kant's categories today

Omar Lughod — Mon, 31 Mar 2008 05:20:09 GMT

Science requires, presumably, a mathematical grounding, which is to say, an apriori synthetic grounding, in order to secure the coherence, significance, and

Re: Kant's categories today

Bruce Merrill — Fri, 28 Mar 2008 14:30:12 GMT

Omar, Why would the new categories be engendered by science? As opposed to coming out of, say, psychology-- insofar as psychology might bring us to the most